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Abstract—In order to meet the performance/privacy require-
ments of future data-intensive mobile applications, e.g., self-
driving cars, mobile data analytics, and AR/VR, service providers
are expected to draw on shared storage/computation/connectivity
resources at the network “edge”. To be cost-effective, a key
functional requirement for such infrastructure is enabling the shar-
ing of heterogeneous resources amongst tenants/service providers
supporting spatially varying and dynamic user demands. This
paper proposes a resource allocation criterion, namely, Share
Constrained Slicing (SCS), for slices allocated predefined shares
of the network’s resources, which extends traditional α−fairness
criterion, by striking a balance among inter- and intra-slice fairness
vs. overall efficiency. We show that SCS has several desirable
properties including slice-level protection, envyfreeness, and load
driven elasticity. In practice, mobile users’ dynamics could make
the cost of implementing SCS high, so we discuss the feasibility
of using a simpler (dynamically) weighted max-min as a surrogate
resource allocation scheme. For a setting with stochastic loads and
elastic user requirements, we establish a sufficient condition for
the stability of the associated coupled network system. Finally,
and perhaps surprisingly, we show via extensive simulations that
while SCS (and/or the surrogate weighted max-min allocation)
provides inter-slice protection, they can achieve improved job delay
and/or perceived throughput, as compared to other weighted max-
min based allocation schemes whose intra-slice weight allocation is
not share-constrained, e.g., traditional max-min or discriminatory
processor sharing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Next generation networks face the challenge of supporting
data-intensive services and applications, such as self-driving
cars, infotainment, augmented/virtual reality [27], Internet of
things [6], [27], and mobile data analytics [1], [12]. In order
to accommodate the performance and privacy requirements of
such services/applications, providers are expected to draw on
shared storage/computation/connectivity resources at the net-
work “edge”. Such network systems can take advantage of
Software-Defined Networking and Network Function Virtual-
ization technologies to provision slices of shared heterogeneous
resources and network functions which are customized to ser-
vice providers’/tenants’ requirements.
The ability to support slice-based provisioning is central
to enabling service providers to take control of managing
performance of their own dynamic and mobile user populations.
This also improves the scalability by reducing the complexity
of performance management on multi-service platforms. The
ability to efficiently share network/compute resources is also
key to reducing the cost of deploying such services. By contrast
with today’s cloud computing platforms, our focus in this paper
is on provisioning slices of edge resources to meet mobile
users/devices requirements. In general, shared edge resources
will have smaller overall capacity resulting in reduced statistical
multiplexing and making efficiency critical. Perhaps similarly
to cloud computing platforms, providers/tenants will want to
make long-term provisioning commitments enabling predictable
costs and resource availability, yet benefit, when possible, of
elastic resource allocations aligned with spatial variations in
their mobile workloads but not at the expense of other slices.
Thus a particularly desirable feature is to enable slice-level
provisioning agreements which achieve inter-slice protection,
load-driven elasticity and network efficiency.
These challenges distinguish our work from previous re-
search in areas including engineering, computer science and
economics. The standard framework used in communication
networks is utility maximization (see e.g., [29] and references
therein), which has led to the design of several transport and
scheduling mechanisms and criteria, e.g., the widely discussed
proportional fairness. When considering dynamic/stochastic net-
works, e.g., [4], [17], researchers have studied networks where
users are allocated resources based on utility maximization
and studied requirements for network stability for ‘elastic’ user
demands, e.g., file transfers. This body of work emphasizes user-
level resource allocations, without specifically accounting for
interactions among slices. Thus, it does not directly address the
requirements of network slicing.
Instead in this paper, we propose a novel approach, namely,
Share Constrained Slicing (SCS), wherein each slice is assigned
a share of the overall resources, and in turn, distributes its share
among its users. Then the user level resource allocation is deter-
mined by maximizing a sharing criterion. When SCS is applied
to a setting where each user only demands one resource, for
example, slices sharing wireless resources in cellular networks
[9], [10], [34], it can be viewed as a Fisher market where agents
(slices), which are share (budget) constrained, bid on network
resources, see, e.g., [25], and for applications [3], [9], [19].
However, those works do not deal with settings where users
require heterogeneous resources, and how to orchestrate slice-
level interactions on different resources is not clear yet.
When it comes to sharing on heterogeneous resources, a
simple solution is static partitioning of all resources according
to a service-level agreement, see, e.g., [21]. It offers each slice
a guaranteed allocation of the network resources thus in prin-
ciple provides ideal protection among slices. However, it falls
short from the perspective of providing load-driven elasticity
to a slice’s users, possibly resulting in either resource under-
utilization or over-booking. Other natural approaches include
full sharing [2], where users from all slices are served based on
some prioritizing discipline without prior resource reservation.
Such schemes may not achieve slice-level protection and are
vulnerable to surging user traffics across slices.
Additionally, many resource sharing schemes have been pro-
posed for cluster computing where heterogeneous resources are
involved, including Dominant Resource Fairness (DRF) [20],
Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Income (CEEI) [24] [31]
[33], Bottleneck Max Fairness (BMF) [5], etc. These allocation
schemes are usually based on modelling joint resource demands
of individual users, but lack of the notion of slicing, thus it is
not clear how to incorporate the need to enable slice-level long-
term commitments. In these works, inter-slice protection and
elasticity of allocations have not been characterized. Further-
more, most of these works are developed under the assumption
that users are sharing a centralized pool of resources. In this
paper we focus on a settings where resources are distributed,
and mobile users are restricted to be served by proximal edge
resources.
Contributions: The novelty of our proposed approach lies
in maintaining slice-level long-term commitments defined by a
service-level agreement, while enabling user-level resource pro-
visioning which is driven by dynamic user loads. We consider
a model where users possibly require heterogeneous resources
in different proportions, and the processing rate of a user scales
linearly in the amount of resources it is allocated. Such a
model captures tasks/services which speeds up in the allocated
resources, which is discussed further in the sequel.
We show that SCS can capture inter- and intra-slice fairness
separately. When viewed as a resource sharing criterion, SCS is
shown to satisfy a set of axiomatically desirable properties akin
to those in [22], and can be interpreted as achieving a tunable
trade-off among inter-slice fairness (which can be seen as a
proxy of protection), intra-slice fairness, and overall utilization.
Fairness is connected to load-driven elasticity through share
constrained weight allocation. The merits of SCS are demon-
strated in both static and dynamic settings. In static settings,
we prove a set of desirable properties of SCS as a sharing
criterion, including slice-level protection and envyfreeness, and
we demonstrate the feasibility of using a simpler (dynamically)
weighted max-min as a surrogate resource allocation scheme for
the cases where the cost of implementing SCS is excessive. In
a dynamic settings, we consider the elastic traffic model where
each user carries a fixed workload, and leaves the system once
the work is processed. We model such system as a stochastic
queuing network, and establish its stability condition.
Finally, and perhaps surprisingly, we show via extensive
simulations that while SCS provides inter-slice protection, it
can also achieve improved average job delay and/or perceived
throughput, as compared with multiple variations of tradi-
tional (weighted) max-min fair allocations but without share-
constrained weight allocation. We provide a heuristic expla-
nation of such improvement that SCS can separate the busy-
periods of different slices, thus reduces inter-slice contention,
and validate the explanation through simulations.
Paper organization: This paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we establish our model for network slicing on het-
erogeneous shared resources, and characterize SCS as satisfying
several axiomatically desirable properties for fairness criterion.
Then, in Section III, several properties of SCS involving slice-
level utility are discussed, including protection, envyfreeness,
and the feasibility of using a simpler weighted max-min as a
surrogate resource allocation scheme. In Section IV, for a setting
with stochastic loads and elastic user traffic, we establish the
stability condition when SCS is applied as the service discipline.
Finally, in Section V, extensive simulations are conducted for
both simple settings where only one resource is shared amongst
slices, and complex settings which resembles a realistic edge
computing scenario, to demonstrate the surprising result that
SCS and/or the surrogate weighted max-min allocation can
achieve improved average job delay and/or perceived throughput
while provides inter-slice protection.
II. RESOURCE SHARING IN NETWORK SLICING
In this section we will briefly introduce the overall frame-
work for resource allocation to network slices, namely, Share
Constrained Slicing (SCS) where each slice manages a possibly
dynamic set of users. Specifically, we will consider resource
allocation driven by the maximization of an objective function
geared at achieving a trade-off between overall efficiency and
fairness [22].
To begin, we consider the set of active users on each slice
to be fixed. Let us denote the set of slices by V , the set of
resources byR, each with a capacity normalized to 1. Each slice
v supports a set of user classes, denoted by Cv, and the total
set of user classes is defined as C := ∪v∈VC
v. For simplicity,
we let v(c) denote the slice which supports class c. We let Uc
denote the set of users of class c, and the users on slice v is
denoted by Uv := ∪c∈CvUc. Also, the overall set of users is
U := ∪v∈VU
v . For each user, possibly heterogeneous resources
are required to achieve certain processing rate. Let us denote
the processing rate seen by user u by λu. We also define the
resource demand vector of user class c as dc := (d
r
c : r ∈ R),
where drc is the fraction of resource r required by user u ∈ Uc
for a unit processing rate, i.e., to achieve λu = 1, we need to
allocate fraction d1c of the total amount of resource 1 to u, d
2
c
of the total amount of resource 2 to u, and so on. If a user
class c does not use a given resource r then drc = 0. Note that
if two slices support users with the same requirements, we will
distinguish them by defining two distinct user classes one for
each slice. In other words, it is possible to have more than one
user classes with exactly the same dc. Also, we let Rc denote
the set of resources required by users of class c, and in turn,
let the set Cr denote user classes using resource r. Among Cr,
the set of classes on slice v is Cvr := Cr ∩ C
v. The number of
active users of class c at time t is denoted by a random variable
Nc(t), and that on slice v by N
v(t). Nv(t) =
∑
c∈Cv Nc(t).
Realizations of these are denoted by lower case variables nc
and nv, respectively.
This model captures the services/applications where tasks
speed up with more allocated resources, e.g., a file download is
faster when allocated more communication resources, or com-
putation task that can be parallelized, e.g., typical MapReduce
jobs [18], and mobile data analytics when additional compute
resources are available [12]. For more complex applications in-
volving different types of stages, the stages conducting massive
data processing might be parallelizable, making it possible to
accelerate by allocating more resources. For example, in mobile
cloud gaming [28], the most time-consuming and resource-
consuming stage is usually the cloud rendering where computing
cluster renders the frames of the game. The rendering procedure
can be accelerated by allocating more GPUs, and thus, can be
viewed as a quantized version of our model.
Example: Let us consider an example where there are
two autonomous vehicle service operators, say Slice 1 and
Slice 2, coexisting in the same area, and supported by two
2
Fig. 1: Example: network slicing in edge computing with
autonomous cars.
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
User
Resource
1 2 3 4 5 Rate
user 1 0.4 0.4 0 0 0 λ1 = 0.4
user 2 0.3 0 0 0.5 0.5 λ2 = 0.5
user 3 0.3 0 0 0.5 0.5 λ3 = 0.5
TABLE I: Example resource allocation
edge computing nodes equipped with fronthaul connectivity
and computational resources (e.g., edge GPUs), as shown in
Fig. 1. Both nodes are connected to the same backhaul node.
Different resources at different locations are indexed as in
the figure. There are 3 vehicles (users) in this area, each of
which corresponds to a user class. Users 1 and 2 are on Slice
1, and User 3 is on Slice 2, respectively. Each autonomous
vehicle can run either of two applications. User 1 is conducting
simple data transmission, with the resource demand vector
d1 = (1, 1, 0, 0, 0), meaning that User 1’s application involves
only connectivity resources, and to achieve a unit transmission
rate for User 1, the system needs to allocate all the connectivity
resources at both Node 1 and the backhaul. Meanwhile, User
2 and 3 are performing mobile data analytics, with demand
vectors d2 = d3 = (0.6, 0, 0, 1, 1), meaning that to achieve
a unit processing rate for Users 2 or 3, the system needs to
allocate 60% of the backhaul resource, all the fronthaul resource,
together with all the computational resource at Node 2. Then,
for example, if the resource allocation is as given in Table I,
the system can achieve user service/processing rates given by
λ1 = 0.4, λ2 = λ3 = 0.5.
Next, we introduce the concept of network share. We assign
each slice v a positive share sv representing the fraction of
overall resources to be committed to slice v. The share alloca-
tions across slices are denoted by s := (sv : v ∈ V). Without
loss of generality we assume
∑
v∈V sv = 1. In turn, each slice
distributes its share sv across its users u ∈ U
v according to a
Share-constrained weight allocation scheme, defined as follows.
Definition 1. Share-constrained weight allocation (SCWA):
A weight allocation across users w := (wu : u ∈ U) is a
share-constrained weight allocation if for each slice v,∑
u∈Uv
wu = sv. (1)
If we consider the weight of each class c as qc :=
∑
u∈Uc
wu,
Eq. (1) implies
∑
c∈Cv qc = sv. As a result, a slice can increase
its users’ weight by purchasing more shares. Also, note that if
the number of users on a slice surges without increasing the
associated share, on average each of its users should be given
less weight. Two examples of SCWA are
1) equal intra-class weight allocation, where user weights
are the same within a user class, i.e., wu =
qc
nc
, for u ∈ Uc
with
∑
c∈Cv qc = sv; and
2) equal intra-slice weight allocation, where user weights
are the same within a slice, i.e., wu =
sv
nv , for u ∈ U
v.
As a result, qc =
sv(c)nc
nv(c)
. One can see that equal intra-
slice allocation is a further special case of equal intra-class
allocation. When each user only demands one resource,
such allocation emerges naturally as the social optimal,
market and Nash equilibrium when slices exhibit (price
taking) strategic behavior in optimizing their own utility,
see [8].
In turn, the resources are ultimately committed to users, so
a user-level resource allocation criterion is necessary. Let us
denote the user rate allocation by λ := (λu : u ∈ U). In this
paper, we assume equal intra-class weight allocation is used,
resulting in equal rate allocation within a user class. Thus a
class-level allocation criterion can be easily converted to a user-
level one. For simplicity, the aggregated rate allocation across
user classes is then denoted by φ = (φc : c ∈ C), where
φc := ncλu, u ∈ Uc, and the weight allocation across user
classes by q = (qc : c ∈ C). For each slice v, the weight
allocation (across user classes) is qv := (qc : c ∈ C
v), and
the rate allocation is φv := (φc : c ∈ C
v). In view of Eq.
(1), we define the normalized weight allocation for slice v as
q˜v := (q˜c :=
qc
sv
: c ∈ Cv). The rate allocation across slices
is γ := (γv :=
∑
c∈Cv φc : v ∈ V). The overall rate across
the system is λ := ‖λ‖1 = ‖φ‖1 = ‖γ‖1, where ‖ · ‖1 is the
L1-norm. SCS is thus defined as follows.
Definition 2. α−Share Constrained Slicing (α−SCS): Under
equal intra-class weight allocation with class weights q, a class-
level rate allocationφ corresponds to α−SCS if it is the solution
to the following problem
max
φ
{Uα(φ;q) :
∑
c∈Cr
drcφc ≤ 1, ∀r ∈ R}, (2)
where α > 0 is a pre-defined parameter and
Uα(φ;q) :=
{
e
∑
v∈V
Uv
α
(φv ;qv) α = 1∑
v∈V U
v
α(φ
v;qv) α > 0 and α 6= 1,
where Uvα(φ
v;qv) represents the utility function of slice v and
is given by
Uvα(φ
v;qv) :=


∑
c∈Cv qc log
(
φc
qc
)
α = 1∑
c∈Cv qc
(φc/qc)
1−α
1−α α > 0 and α 6= 1.
The criterion underlying SCS is different from class-level
(weighted) α−fairness proposed in [23] and [4], which is
defined as follows.
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Definition 3. Class-level α−fairness: Under equal intra-class
weight allocation, given q, a class-level rate allocation φ
corresponds to (weighted) α−fairness if it is the solution to
Problem (2) with utility function of slice v given by
Uvα(φ
v;qv) :=
{ ∑
c∈Cv qc log (φc) α = 1∑
c∈Cv qc
(φc)
1−α
1−α α > 0 and α 6= 1.
As shown in [23], α−fairness is equivalent to (weighted)
proportional fairness as α = 1 and unweighted maxmin fairness
as α→∞, while the asymptotic characterization of α−SCS is
given as follows.
Corollary 1. α−SCS is equivalent to (weighted) proportional
fairness as α = 1, and weighted max-min fairness as α→∞.
Here under equal intra-class weight allocation, weighted
proportional fairness is defined as the solution to the following
problem:
max
φ
{∑
c∈C
qc logφc :
∑
c∈Cr
drcφc ≤ 1, ∀r ∈ R
}
, (3)
and weighted max-min fairness is defined as the solution to the
following problem:
max
φ
{
min
c∈C
φc
qc
:
∑
c∈Cr
drcφc ≤ 1, ∀r ∈ R
}
. (4)
The persistence of weight is important, especially when
α increases. Otherwise, the notion of share does not matter
when α is large, undermining inter-slice protection. To the best
of our knowledge, SCS is the first variation of α−fairness
incorporating user weighting in a consistent manner.
Proof: When α = 1, one can see that the maximum is
assumed when
∑
c∈C qc log
(
φc
qc
)
assumes maximum. Due to
the concavity, a rate allocation φ∗ := (φ∗c : c ∈ C) is the
maximizer if and only if∑
c∈C
qc
φ∗c
(φ′c − φ
∗
c) ≤ 0,
for any feasible φ′. Also, for α−SCS with weight q, when
α 6= 1, φ∗ is the maximizer if and only if
∑
c∈C
(
φ∗c
qc
)−α
(φ′c − φ
∗
c) ≤ 0,
for any feasible φ′. One can see that two optimality conditions
coincide when α = 1.
The asymptotic behavior when α → ∞ is a direct corollary
of the Lemma 3 in [23].
Let us define function fα(x;y) of two positive vectors x,y ∈
R
n
+ such that ‖x‖1 = ‖y‖1 = 1 as
fα(x;y) =


e−DKL(x‖y) α = 1(∑
i xi
(
yi
xi
)1−α) 1α
α > 0, α 6= 1,
(5)
where DKL(·‖·) represents the Kulback-Leibler (K-L) diver-
gence. The function fα(x;y) can be viewed as a measure of
how close a normalized resource allocation x is to a normalized
weight vector y in that, for example, when α = 1, it decreases
with the K-L divergence between x and y, thus assumes max-
imum when x = y, meaning that the rate allocation is aligned
with the specified weights. Thus fα(x;y) can be interpreted as
a measure of y−weighted fairness of allocation x.
One can easily show that fα(x;y) is continuous. Moreover,
for general α and a given y, the following claim can be shown
by setting the partial derivative of the associated Lagrangian to
0.
Proposition 1. fα(x;y) assumes maximum when the rate is
aligned with the weight when no constraint is imposed, i.e.,
fα(y;y) = max
x
fα(x;y) (6)
One can show that for a given α, α−SCS criterion can be
factorized as follows.
Proposition 2. For the α−SCS criterion,
Uα(φ;q) = Eα(λ)
(
F interα (γ)F
intra
α (φ;q)
)α
, (7)
where Eα(λ), F
inter
α (γ) and F
intra
α (φ;q) can be interpreted
as the overall network efficiency, inter-slice and intra-slice
fairness, respectively.
In Eq. (7), the efficiency is captured by a concave non-
decreasing function of λ given by
Eα(λ) :=
{
λ α = 1
λ1−α
1−α α > 0 and α 6= 1.
The inter-slice fairness function is given by
F interα (γ) := fα(γ˜; s),
where γ˜ := (γ˜v := γv/λ : v ∈ V) is the normalized aggregated
rate across slices. Let us define the normalized rate allocation
across user classes on slice v as φ˜v := (φ˜c :=
φc
γv : c ∈ C
v).
The intra-slice fairness term is then given by
F intraα (φ;q) :=


e
∑
v∈V
tv
α
(γ˜;s) log fα(φ˜
v ;q˜v) α = 1(∑
v∈V t
v
α(γ˜; s)(fα(φ˜
v; q˜v))α
) 1
α
α 6= 1,
where tvα(γ˜; s) can be viewed as the weight for the fairness of
each slice v:
tvα(γ˜; s) :=
sv(
γ˜v
sv
)1−α∑
v′∈V sv′(
γ˜v′
s
v′
)1−α
. (8)
One can see that Eq. (7) captures a trade-off among overall
network efficiency, inter-slice fairness, which can be seen as
a proxy of inter-slice protection, and intra-slice fairness. The
significance of fairness increases as α increases. When α→ 0,
α−SCS is maximizing the overall rate allocated, regardless of
the weights. In order to achieve desirable resource utilization,
a sharing criterion should realize load-driven elasticity, i.e., the
amount of resources provisioned to a user class increases in the
number of its users. Under equal intra-slice weight allocation,
from Eq. (7) one can observe that, due to the fairness terms, the
relative resource allocation of a slice tends to be aligned with
q˜v = (ncnv : c ∈ C
v), i.e., its relative load distribution. Thus the
elasticity of α−SCS is achieved as a result of weighted fairness.
Specifically under SCS and parallel resource assumption, i.e.,
each user only uses one resource, |Rc| = 1, ∀c ∈ C, one can
show the following result.
Theorem 1. Under equal intra-slice weight allocation, assum-
ing |Rc| = 1, ∀c ∈ C, α−SCS is such that φc is a monotonically
increasing function of nc, when nc′ is fixed for c
′ 6= c.
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Specifically in the setting of Theorem 1, each resource r
will provision its resource across user classes in proportion to
sv(c)nc
nv(c)
.
Such elasticity is key to achieving a sharing scheme that
is aware of the inter-slice protection, while still improves the
resource utilization by accommodating dynamic user loads on
different slices.
III. STATIC ANALYSIS
A. System model
In this section we will take a closer look at the characteriza-
tion of SCS slice level rate allocations.
The SCS criterion (Problem (2)) is equivalent to the solution
to the following problem
max
φ
{∑
v∈V
Uvα(φ
v;qv) :
∑
c∈Cr
drcφc ≤ 1, ∀r ∈ R
}
. (9)
We shall explore two key desirable properties for a sharing
criterion, namely, protection and envyfreeness. In our setting,
protection means that no slice is penalized under SCS sharing
vs. static partitioning. Envyfreeness means that no slice is
motivated to swap its resource allocation with another slice
with a smaller share. These two properties together motivate
the choice of α−SCS sharing, and at least partially purchasing
a larger share in order to improve performance.
B. Protection
Formally, let us characterize protection among slices by how
much performance deterioration is possible for a slice when
switching from static partitioning to α−SCS sharing. Note that
under static partitioning, slices are decoupled, so inter-slice
protection is achieved possibly at the cost of efficiency. To be
specific, the rate allocation for slice v under static partitioning
is given by the following problem.
max
φv

Uvα(φv;qv) :
∑
c∈Cv
r
drcφc ≤ sv, ∀r ∈ R

 , (10)
From now on, for a given α, let us denote the rate allocation
for slice v under α−SCS by φv,S := (φSc : c ∈ C
v), and
that under static partitioning by φv,P := (φPc : c ∈ C
v). The
parameter α is suppressed when there is no ambiguity. The
following result demonstrates that α−SCS with α = 1 achieves
inter-slice protection in that any slice achieves a better utility
under α−SCS sharing.
Theorem 2. For a given q, when the resource allocation is
performed according to α−SCS, difference in slice v’s utility
compared to that under static partitioning is upper-bounded by
(when α 6= 1)
Uαv (φ
v,P ;qv)− Uαv (φ
v,S ;qv) ≤
sv
(∑
c∈Cv
q˜c(
∑
r∈Rc
drcν
∗
r )
α−1
α −
∑
c∈C
qc(
∑
r∈Rc
drcν
∗
r )
α−1
α
)
,
where q˜c := qc/sv(c) is the normalized weight of class c, and
ν∗r is the optimal dual variable associated with the capacity
constraint at resource r in Problem (9), also known as the
shadow price of resource r.
Remark: The right hand side characterizes how the pro-
tection changes with α.
∑
c∈Cv q˜c(
∑
r∈Rc
drcν
∗
r )
1− 1
α can
be viewed as the average of the (1 − 1α )−order mo-
ment of ‘charged’ resource usage of slice v’s user, while∑
c∈C qc(
∑
r∈Rc
drcν
∗
r )
1− 1
α is that of the overall users. When
0 < α < 1, sharing tends to benefit slices with greater average
user usages, at the cost of other slices, while when α > 1, slices
with smaller average user prices are preferred.
When α→ 1, the utility of slice v, Uαv (φ
v;qv) = 11−α
×
∑
c∈Cv qc
(
φc
qc
)1−α
tends to be non-changing with φ, so the
result in Theorem 2 seems to be trivial. However, due to the
factor 11−α , the utility function is not well-defined at α → 1.
Thus the exact result for α need to be discussed on its own, as
in Theorem 3.
Also, note that when SCWA constraint Eq. (1) is voided,
another form of the theorem can be written as
Uαv (φ
v,P ;qv)− Uαv (φ
v,S ;qv) ≤ wv(pv − sv
w0
wv
p¯0),
where wv :=
∑
c∈Cv qc is the total weight of users of slice
v, w0 :=
∑
c∈C qc is the total weight of all users, pv :=∑
c∈Cv q˜c
(∑
r∈Rc
drcν
∗
r
)1− 1
α is the average 1− 1α power of the
prices of slice v’s users, and p¯0 :=
∑
v
wv
w0
pv is the weighted
average of pv across all slices. One could see that, if wv is
not limited, as wv → ∞, as long as pv 6= p¯0, the gap can
be arbitrarily bad, implying significant utility loss when slice-
level sharing is used. In comparison, If we use SCWA, i.e.,
constrained by Eq. (1), the right hand side equals to sv(pv− p¯0).
This quantity is small when sv is small, or slice v’s users do
not use many ‘expensive’ resources.
Proof: Under sharing scheme, the rate allocation for each
slice v should be the same as the solution to the following
problem:
max
φv
Uvα(φ
v;qv)
such that
∑
c∈Cv
r
drcφc ≤
∑
c∈Cv
r
drcφ
S
c , ∀r ∈ R. (11)
Problem (11) yields solution φv,S. In comparison, under static
partitioning scheme, the rate allocation for slice v is given by
max
φv
Uvα(φ
v;qv)
such that
∑
c∈Cv
r
drcφc ≤ sv, ∀r ∈ R, (12)
which can be regarded as a perturbed version of Problem (11),
and yields solution φv,P. It is a well known result in convex
optimization [7] that the change in the optimal objective function
value due to perturbation of the constraints can be bounded by:
Uαv (φ
v,P;qv)− Uαv (φ
v,S;qv) ≤
∑
r∈R
ν∗r

∑
c∈Cv
r
drcφ
S
c − sv

 .
(13)
The Lagrangian of Problem (11) is
Lα(φv;ν) = −
1
1− α
∑
c∈Cv
qc
(
φc
qc
)1−α
+
∑
r∈R
νr(
∑
c∈Cv
r
drcφc −
∑
c∈Cv
r
drcφ
S
c ). (14)
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Setting the partial derivative against φv to 0, we obtain the dual
function as:
gα(ν) = −
1
1− α
∑
c∈Cv
qc
(∑
r∈Rc
drcνr
)1− 1
α
+
∑
r∈R
νr

∑
c∈Cv
r
drcqc
( ∑
r′∈Rc
dr
′
c νr′
)− 1
α
−
∑
c∈Cv
r
drcφ
S
c

 .
Also,
φSc = qc
( ∑
r′∈Rc
dr
′
c ν
∗
r′
)− 1
α
. (15)
By swapping the order of summation, one can show that
∑
r∈R
νr
∑
c∈Cv
r
drcqc
( ∑
r′∈Rc
dr
′
c νr′
)− 1
α
=
∑
c∈Cv
qc
(∑
r∈Rc
drcνr
)1− 1
α
.
Due to strong convexity of Problem (11), we know
gα(ν∗) = −
1
1− α
∑
c∈Cv
qc
(
φSc
qc
)1−α
.
Plugging in Eq. (15) we have
∑
c∈Cv
qc
(∑
r∈Rc
drcν
∗
r
)1− 1
α
−
∑
r∈R
ν∗r
∑
c∈Cv
r
drcφ
S
c = 0. (16)
Note that if a resource is binding, the sum of resource allocated
should equal to 1. Otherwise it has 0 shadow price. Summing
above across v ∈ V , we have
∑
c∈C
qc
(∑
r∈Rc
drcν
∗
r
)1− 1
α
−
∑
r∈R
ν∗r = 0. (17)
Plugging in the right hand side of Eq. (13) to substitute∑
r∈R ν
∗
r , and also plugging in Eq. (15), the theorem is proved.
Following is the result specifically for the case when α = 1.
Theorem 3. For a given q, when the resource allocation is
performed according to 1−SCS, slice v’s utility exceeds that
under static partitioning (Problem (10)), i.e.,
Uv1 (φ
v,P ;qv) ≤ Uv1 (φ
v,S ;qv). (18)
Remark: It is a straightforward observation that under
α−SCS, the global utility
∑
v∈V U
v
1 (φ
v;qv) is improved since
it can be viewed as relaxing the system constraints. However,
Theorem 3 asserts that this holds uniformly on a per slice basis.
Proof: Similar to the argument for general α, we have that
the gap between sharing and static partitioning satisfies Eq. (13).
Also, by solving the first order condition, one can obtain that
φSc =
qc∑
r∈Rc
dr
c
ν∗
r
. By plugging in this expression and swapping
the order of summation we have
Uv1 (φ
v,P ;qv)− Uv1 (φ
v,S ;qv) ≤ sv(1−
∑
r∈R
ν∗r ), (19)
where ν∗r is the shadow price of resource r under SCS, or the
dual variables associated with the capacity constraints.
Then if we have
∑
r∈R ν
∗
r = 1, the proof is complete. For
α = 1, the Lagrangian is given by
L1(φv;ν) = −
∑
c∈Cv
qc logφc+
∑
r∈R
νr(
∑
c∈Cv
r
drcφc−
∑
c∈Cv
r
drcφ
S
c ).
By setting the derivative against φv to 0, we have the dual
function as
g1(ν) = −
∑
c∈Cv
qc log
qc∑
r∈Rc
drcνr
+ sv −
∑
r∈R
νr
∑
c∈Cv
r
drcφ
S
c ,
and
φSc =
qc∑
r∈Rc
drcν
∗
r
. (20)
By strong duality, maximal dual should be minimal primal
function. And optimal dual is achieved at the shadow price ν∗.
Thus,
g1(ν∗) = −
∑
c∈Cv
qc logφ
S
c ,
which gives us
sv −
∑
r∈R
ν∗r
∑
c∈Cv
r
drcφ
S
c = 0. (21)
Summing above across v ∈ V we have 1 −
∑
r∈R ν
∗
r = 0.
Because if a resource is binding, the sum of rate allocated should
be equal to 1. Otherwise it has 0 shadow price. Plugging above
result into Eq. (19), the theorem is proved.
C. Envyfreeness
Formally, envyfreeness is defined under the assumption that,
for two slices v and v′, if they swap their allocated resources,
slice v’s associated utility will not be improved if sv′ ≤ sv.
Before swapping, the rate allocation for slice v is given by
φv,S , while after swapping with slice v′, its rate allocation is
determined by solving following problem:
max
φv
{Uvα(φ
v;qv) :
∑
c∈Cv
r
drcφc ≤
∑
c∈Cv′
r
drcφ
S
c , ∀r ∈ R}.
Note that
∑
c∈Cv′
r
drcφ
S
c corresponds to the fraction of re-
source r provisioned to slice v′. Let us denote the solution to
such problem for slice v as φv↔v
′
. Then we have following
result.
Theorem 4. The difference between the utility obtained by slice
v under α−SCS with SCWA, and that under static partitioning
within the resource provisioned to another slice v′ is upper-
bounded by the following inequality:
Uvα(φ
v↔v′ ;qv)− Uvα(φ
v,S ;qv) ≤
∑
c∈Cv′
qc
(∑
r∈Rc
drcν
∗
r
)α−1
α
−
∑
c∈Cv
qc
(∑
r∈Rc
drcν
∗
r
)α−1
α
.
Remark: As a special case, when α = 1, the right hand
side of the inequality becomes sv′ − sv, and thus a slice has no
incentive to swap its allocation with another with a less or equal
share, which implies SCS is envyfree. Envyfreeness implies that
α−SCS achieves desirable resource utilization in that the right
portion of resource is provisioned to the right slice.
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Proof: Still by the sensitivity of convex optimization prob-
lem [7], we have
Uvα(λ
v↔v′ ;qv)− Uvα(λ
v,S ;qv) ≤
∑
r∈R
ν∗r

∑
c∈Cv′
r
drcφ
S
c −
∑
c∈Cv
r
drcφ
S
c

 . (22)
Then by substituting Eq. (16) the theorem is proved.
D. Using ∞−SCS as a surrogate for 1−SCS
From previous discussions, one can see that it is of particular
interest to use 1−SCS as the fairness criterion, for it achieves
strict protection and envyfreeness. When α = 1, α−SCS
becomes weighted proportional fairness, whose solution usually
involves iterative methods, and the complexity increases rapidly
with the number of user classes as well as the accuracy require-
ment, see, e.g., [26], making it hard to implement in large-scale.
In comparison, weighted max-min is relatively easy to imple-
ment in distributed manner, see [20] for example. Specifically a
progressive water-filling algorithm [26] has O(|C|maxc∈C |Rc|)
complexity. Thus, in our work we will discuss the feasibility of
using∞−SCS, which is equivalent to a (dynamically) weighted
maxmin, as a surrogate to 1−SCS. If the resulted utility function
is not far from the optimum of 1−SCS criterion, we shall assert
∞−SCS achieves similar performance as 1−SCS.
For simplicity, we consider the original form of weighted-log
utility, given by
Ψ(φ;q) :=
∑
c∈C
qc logφc. (23)
Then for the overall utility achieved, we have following theorem.
Theorem 5. For a given weight allocation q, if drc ≥ 1, ∀r ∈
R, c ∈ C, we have
Ψ(φ∗,1;q)−Ψ(φ∗,∞;q) ≤
∑
c∈C
qcDc − 1, (24)
where φ∗,α := (φ∗,αc : c ∈ C) is the optimal rate allocation
under α−SCS, and Dc :=
∑
r∈Rc
drc .
Remark: First note that the condition drc ≥ 1 can be easily
satisfied by rescaling the unit of rate without loss of generality.
Also by rescaling, one can show that such bound vanishes
when each user class is associated with only one resource, i.e.,
|Rc| = 1, ∀c ∈ C, and d
r
c are the same, e.g., d
r
c = 1. Such
bound implies that, the suboptimality due to using a surrogate
solution to achieve weighted proportional fairness depends on
the diversity in the users’ requirements on resources. Also, this
gap of suboptimality cannot be arbitrarily bad because under
SCWA, we have
∑
c qc = 1, thus the right hand side of Eq.
(24) is at most maxcDc − 1.
Proof: Note that when α→∞, SCS approaches weighted
maxmin, which can be solved by a progressive water-filling al-
gorithm. Let us denote the resource where class c is bottlenecked
under weighted maxmin by r(c), and in turn, the set of users
being bottlenecked at resource r by C˜r . Let us define ν
∗
r as
the shadow price for resource r when α = 1. According to the
definition we have
Ψ(φ∗,1;q)−Ψ(φ∗,∞;q)
=
∑
c
qc(log φ
∗,1
c − logφ
∗,∞
c )
≤
∑
c
qc
(
log
qc∑
r′∈Rc
dr′c ν
∗
r′
− log

 qc∑
c′∈Cr(c)
d
r(c)
c′ qc′




=
∑
r∈R
∑
c∈C˜r
qc log
( ∑
c′∈Cr
drc′qc′∑
r′∈Rc
dr′c ν
∗
r′
)
.
The first inequality follows from the form of solution of sharing
problem when α = 1, and the fact that φ∗,∞c ≥
qc
∑
c′∈C
r(c)
d
r(c)
c′
q
c′
,
since the worst rate user u could obtain is when there is no other
users get saturated before it at its bottleneck resource. Because
log x ≤ x− 1 we have
Ψ(φ∗,1;q)−Ψ(λ∗,∞;q)
≤
∑
r∈R
∑
c∈C˜r
qc
∑
c′∈Cr
drc′qc′∑
r′∈Rc
dr′c ν
∗
r′
− 1
=
∑
r∈R
(∑
c′∈Cr
drc′qc′
)∑
c∈C˜r
qc∑
r′∈Rc
dr′c ν
∗
r′
− 1
≤
∑
r∈R
(∑
c′∈Cr
drc′qc′
)∑
c∈Cr
qc∑
r′∈Rc
dr′c ν
∗
r′
− 1
≤
∑
r∈R
(∑
c′∈Cr
drc′qc′
)∑
c∈Cr
drcqc∑
r′∈Rc
dr′c ν
∗
r′
− 1
≤
∑
r∈R
(∑
c′∈Cr
drc′qc′
)
− 1.
The penultimate inequality holds true because drc ≥ 1, ∀c ∈
Cr. The last inequality comes from the capacity constraint, by
plugging in φ∗,1c =
qc∑
r∈Rc
dr
c
ν∗
r
into
∑
c∈Cr
drcφ
∗,1
c ≤ 1, we
have
∑
c∈Cr
dr
c
qc∑
r′∈Rc
dr′
c
ν∗
r′
≤ 1. Then by swapping the order of
summation, we have
∑
r∈R
(∑
c′∈Cr
drc′qc′
)
=
∑
c∈C
qc
∑
r∈Rc
drc =
∑
c∈C
qcDc.
IV. ELASTIC TRAFFIC MODEL
A. System model
In this section we switch gears to study a scenario where the
user traffic is elastic, i.e., each user carries a certain amount of
work and leaves the system once it is finished. Specifically, for
a class-c user, we assume that its service requirement is drawn
from an exponential distribution with mean 1µc independently,
and its arrival follows a Poisson process with intensity νc. Then
the traffic intensity associated with user class c is given by ρc =
νc
µc
.
Let us first consider a given time instant, when the size of Uc
and Uv are given by nc and n
v respectively. Also, for simplicity
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we assume equal intra-slice weight allocation, thus qc =
sv(c)nc
nv(c)
.
Substituting qc into Problem (2), the α−SCS criterion can be
rewritten as follows.
max
φ
∑
c∈C
(sv(c)nc
nv(c)
)α (φc)1−α
1− α
(25)
such that
∑
c∈Cr
φcd
r
c ≤ 1, ∀r ∈ R.
B. Stability
Problem (25) characterizes the rate allocation across classes
when the numbers of users in the network are fixed. However,
it is natural to study the evolution of the system when user dis-
tributions are random processes. Note that while [4] studied the
stability condition for α−fairness when weights are introduced,
their weights do not depend on the dynamic distribution of users
in the network. By using the fluid system theory established in
[16], [15] and [14], one can show that SCS stablizes the system
as long as no resource is overloaded.
Theorem 6. Assume that under equal intra-slice weight alloca-
tion, the rate allocation is given by Problem (25). Then, when
the following effective load conditions are satisfied:∑
c∈Cr
ρcd
r
c < 1, ∀r ∈ R, (26)
the network is stable.
Remark: Theorem 6 is significant in that the system might
become transient under specific sharing criterion even when Eq.
(26) is satisfied, e.g., Example 1 in [4] when strict priorities
are designated in favor of the system throughput. Moreover,
Example 2 in the same literature demonstrates that even no strict
priority is designated, instability is still possible under Eq. (26).
Those examples implies the importance of SCS sharing and
associated weight allocation schemes.
The result in [4] is under the assumption that each user
has a fixed weight. Thus the overall resources committed to
a slice increases with the number of its active users, possibly
compromising inter-slice protection. Theorem 6 shows that even
when inter-slice protection is maintained, SCS can still stablize
the system through efficient utilization.
Proof: This can be proved by studying the “fluid system”
associated with the service discipline proposed. Briefly, the
“fluid system” associated with a queuing system is its asymp-
totic version when the transition frequency is very high and the
change of the queue length in one transition is infinitesimal.
Such limiting is approached by rescaling the time axis. The
stability of the original queuing system can then be examined
by studying the associated “fluid system”, see, for example, [15],
[14], and [16].
According to [15] and [14], if one can show that such fluid
system gets empty eventually, the associated original queuing
system is positive recurrent. In view of this result, the outline
of the proof is as follows. Firstly we establish two functions
K(t) and H(t) such that K(t) ≥ H(t) ≥ 0, where H(t) only
takes 0 value when all the fluid limits equal to 0. Then we find
a lower bound on the negative drift rate of K(t) so that we can
conclude that K(t) → 0 eventually. Therefore H(t), together
with all the fluid limits tend to 0 eventually.
Let us define the vector of users’ distribution as N(t) =
(Nc(t) : c ∈ C). Consider the set of “fluid limits” defined by:
x(t) = lim
ω→∞
N(ωt)
ω
, with
∑
c∈C
Nc(0) = ω, (27)
where x(t) := (xc(t) : c ∈ C) is the vector of fluid limit
for each class. If such limit exists, we have
∑
c∈C xc(0) = 1.
According to the Lemma 4.2 in [15], from Strong Law of
Large Number one can derive that, x(t) is deterministic and
the dynamic of such fluid limits system is actually determined
by the rate allocation problem associated with the fluid limits.
That is, x(t) follows the differential equations:
d
dt
xc(t) = νc − µcφ˜c(t), when xc(t) > 0, (28)
where φ˜c(t) is the aggregated rate allocated to the fluid limit of
class-c, which should be given by the following problem:
max
φ˜:=(φ˜c:c∈C)
∑
c∈C

 sv(c)xc(t)∑
c′∈Cv
xc′(t)


α
φ˜1−αc (t)
1− α
(29)
such that
∑
c∈Cr
φ˜c(t)d
r
c ≤ 1, ∀r ∈ R.
Let us assume that φ˜(t) achieves the maximum of Problem
(29). Then the concavity of the objective function, together with
the first-order optimality condition gives us
G′(ζ) · (ζ −Λ) ≤ 0,
where G(·) is the objective function of Problem (29), for any
feasible rate allocation vector ζ. Also note that, if the capacity
constraints Eq. (26) are satisfied by ρ, there exists ǫ > 0 such
that (1 + ǫ)ρ also satisfies Eq. (26). Plugging in (1 + ǫ)ρ as ζ
to the above inequality we have:
∑
c∈C
(
sv(c)xc(t)∑
c′∈Cv xc′(t)
)α
ρ−αc (ρc − φ˜c(t))
≤ −ǫ
∑
c∈C
(
sv(c)xc(t)∑
c′∈Cv xc′(t)
)α
ρ1−αc . (30)
If we define function K(t) as
K(t) :=
∑
v∈V
(sv)
α
∑
c∈Cv
∫ t
0
(
xc(τ)∑
c′∈Cv
x
c′ (τ)
)α
(ρc−φ˜c(τ))
(ρc)α
dτ
+ 1µ¯ρ¯α
∑
v∈V
(sv)
α|Cv|−
α
2
α+1 ‖xv(0)‖α+1, (31)
where µ¯ = maxc µc, and ρ¯ = maxc ρc are the maximal
processing rate and effective load across user types, respectively,
and we define the fluid limit vector of slice v at time t as
xv(t) := (xc(t) : c ∈ C
v), with its Lk−norm denoted by
‖xv(t)‖k. We have that Eq. (30) is equivalent to
d
dt
K(t) ≤ −ǫ
∑
c∈C
(
sv(c)xc(t)∑
c′∈Cv xc′(t)
)α
ρ1−αc . (32)
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The right hand side of the above inequality can be bounded
by:
∑
c∈C
(
sv(c)xc(t)∑
c′∈Cv xc′(t)
)α
ρ1−αc
≥ sαminρ
1−α
bound
∑
v
∑
c∈Cv
(
xc(t)∑
c′∈Cv xc′(t)
)α
≥ sαminρ
1−α
boundmin{1, (maxv
|Cv|)1−α},
where smin = minv sv, ρbound takes ρ¯ when α > 1 and takes
minc ρc when 0 < α < 1. The inequality is due to that for each
active slice (a slice is said to be active if
∑
c∈Cv xc(t) > 0), we
have two possible cases:
1) When 0 < α ≤ 1, we have
∑
c∈Cv

 xc(t)∑
c′∈Cv
xc′(t)


α
≥

∑
c∈Cv
xc(t)∑
c′∈Cv
xc′(t)


α
= 1,
due to the concavity of power-α.
2) When α > 1, we have
∑
c∈Cv

 xc(t)∑
c′∈Cv
xc′(t)


α
=
∑
c∈Cv
xαc (t)( ∑
c∈Cv
xc(t)
)α ≥ |Cv|1−α.
The inequality is due to that ‖xv(t)‖α|C
v|1−
1
α ≥
‖xv(t)‖1 when α > 1, see [32].
Thus we found a lower bound for each v. By noting that there
should be at least one active user type before the fluid system
gets emptied, we can get the last factor by taking the minimum
across all slices.
Thus, we have
d
dt
K(t) ≤ −ǫsαminρ
1−α
boundmin{1, (maxv
|Cv|)1−α}
K(t) ≤ K(0)− ǫsαminρ
1−α
boundmin{1, (maxv
|Cv|)1−α}t. (33)
In order to find a lower bound of K(t), we observe that for
each slice v ∈ V we have
∑
c∈Cv
∫ t
0
(
xc(τ)∑
c′∈Cv xc′(τ)
)α
ρ−αc (ρc − φ˜c(τ))dτ
≥
1
µ¯ρ¯α
∑
c∈Cv
∫ t
0
(
xc(τ)∑
c′∈Cv xc′(τ)
)α
dxc(τ),
and∑
c∈Cv
∫ t
0
(
xc(τ)∑
c∈Cv xc(τ)
)α
dxc(τ)
yc(t):=(xc(t))
α+1
=========
1
α+ 1
∑
c∈Cv
∫ yc(t)
yc(0)

 1∑
c′∈Cv
(yc′(τ))
1
α+1


α
dyc(τ)
=
1
α+ 1
∑
c∈Cv
∫ yc(t)
yc(0)


(∑
c′∈Cv
(yc′(τ))
1
α+1
)α+1
− α
α+1
dyc(τ)
=
1
α+ 1
∑
c∈Cv
∫ yc(t)
yc(0)
(
‖yv(τ)‖ 1
α+1
)− α
α+1
dyc(τ)
≥
1
α+ 1
∑
c∈Cv
∫ yc(t)
yc(0)
(|Cv|α‖yv(τ)‖1)
− α
α+1 dyc(τ)
=
|Cv|−
α
2
α+1
α+ 1
∫ ‖yv(t)‖1
‖yv(0)‖1
(‖yv(τ)‖1)
− α
α+1 d (‖yv(τ)‖1)
= |Cv|−
α
2
α+1
(
(‖yv(t)‖1)
1
α+1 − (‖yv(0)‖1)
1
α+1
)
= |Cv|−
α
2
α+1 (‖xv(t)‖α+1 − ‖x
v(0)‖α+1) ,
where the inequality comes from the relation between L1−norm
and L( 1α+1 )−norm, and the following equality is by moving the
summation into the integral. Plugging the above inequality into
the definition of K(t), we have
K(t) ≥
1
µ¯ρ¯α
∑
v∈V
(sv)
α
∑
c∈Cv
∫ t
0

 xc(τ)∑
c′∈Cv
xc′(τ)


α
dxc(τ)
+
1
µ¯ρ¯α
∑
v∈V
(sv)
α|Cv|−
α
2
α+1 ‖xv(0)‖α+1
≥
1
µ¯ρ¯α
∑
v∈V
(sv)
α|Cv|−
α
2
α+1 (‖xv(t)‖α+1 − ‖x
v(0)‖α+1)
+
1
µ¯ρ¯α
∑
v∈V
(sv)
α|Cv|−
α
2
α+1 ‖xv(0)‖α+1
=
1
µ¯ρ¯α
∑
v∈V
(sv)
α|Cv|−
α
2
α+1 ‖xv(t)‖α+1.
Let us define
H(t) :=
1
µ¯ρ¯α
∑
v∈V
(sv)
α|Cv|−
α
2
α+1 ‖xv(t)‖α+1. (34)
Thus, we can conclude K(t) ≥ H(t) ≥ 0, where the non-
negativity of H(t) is straightforward, and H(t) = 0 only when
xc(t) = 0, ∀c ∈ C. Therefore, if we take
T =
F (0)
ǫsαminρ
1−α
boundmin{1, (maxv |C
v|)1−α}
,
K(t) = H(t) ≡ 0 when t ≥ T , implying xc(t) ≡ 0 eventually
for all c ∈ C. Thus the system is positive recurrent.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
One might think by introducing inter-slice protection, SCS ef-
fectively imposes additional constraints to the service discipline,
thus is compromised in users’ performance. However, this needs
not to be true, as we will demonstrate via extensive simulations
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in this section. We compare the performance of SCS versus
several benchmarks, including:
1) Dominant Resource Fairness (DRF) [20], which is a vari-
ation of weighted maxmin fairness where users’ weights
are associated with their resource demands. Here to in-
corporate network slicing, we use its variation where a
user’s weight is also associated with equal intra-slice
weight allocation, i.e., wu =
sv
Nv
· δu, u ∈ U
v, where
δu is the dominant share of user u and is given by
δu :=
1
maxr∈R drc
, u ∈ Uc.
2) (Discriminatory) Processor Sharing (DPS) [2], [13]. To
apply to the multi-resource case, we implement DPS as
a variation of maxmin fairness where user u’s weight is
wu = sv, u ∈ U
v, without the notion of per-slice share
constraint and inter-slice protection.
Note that because SCS might be hard to scalably compute
for general α, we propose the use of ∞−SCS, as a surrogate
resource allocation scheme.
In our simulations, we focus on two performance metrics:
mean delay and mean throughput. The delay is defined as the
sojourn time of each user, i.e., how long it takes for a user to
complete service. The throughput is defined as the workload
divided by the sojourn time of each user. The performance
of different sharing schemes were compared in a range of
settings, from a simple single resource setting, to more complex
cases where different services/tasks are coupled together through
shared resources.
A. Single-resource cases
Since for more complicated network setup, the system per-
formance (for example, processing rate) is often determined
by resource allocations at certain ‘bottleneck’ resources, we
first consider single-resource setting. Note that, under such
circumstances, SCS coincides with General Processor Sharing
(GPS) [30] as well as DRF because all classes of users c ∈ C are
associated with the same resource, and have the same demand.
To begin with, we consider a simple scenario where |V| = 2,
and each slice only supports one user class, so in this set-
ting, a user class corresponds to a slice. Two slices shares
one resource, referred to as Resource 1 with capacity 1, and
d11 = d
1
2 = 1. Their traffic models are assumed to be symmetric,
with mean arrival rates ν1 = ν2 = 0.45 and mean workloads
1
µ1
= 1µ2 = 1. Their shares, however, are tuned to achieve
different performance trade-offs. The share of Slice 1, s1, ranges
from 0.01 to 0.99, while s2 = 1− s1. The achieved mean user
perceived delay and throughput are illustrated in Fig. 2. One can
see that while the average delays are marginally better under
∞−SCS, ∞−SCS clearly outperforms DPS on the average
throughput. For example, when two slices have the same share
s1 = s2 = 0.5, SCS increases the throughput of users on both
slice by ∼10%.
This phenomenon was widely observed under different traffic
assumptions. For example, when the traffics are asymmetric,
with mean arrival rates ν1 = 0.6, ν2 = 0.3 and mean workload
1
µ1
= 1µ2 = 1, the results are illustrated in Fig. 3. Also, for
symmetric traffics with arrival rates of 0.45 and the workloads
are set to a constant 1, the results are shown in Fig. 4. In general,
while the mean delay achieved by SCS is marginally better than
DPS, the mean throughput achieved is improved significantly.
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Fig. 2: Performance trade-offs of single-resource case under
symmetric traffic.
To explain the somewhat surprising result, we conjectured
that due to the inter-slice protection built into SCS, under
stochastic traffic, the slice with fewer customers tends to see
higher processing rate than other sharing criterion, as a result
the customers leave the system faster. Overall, SCS tends to
separate the busy periods of slices, so that the level of inter-slice
contention is reduced. We validated our conjecture by measuring
the busy period under the symmetric traffic pattern, where the
arrival rates of both slices are the same, and are tuned from
0.05 to 0.45, with s1 = s2 = 0.5. Other parameters are the
same as in the setting in Fig. 2. We plot the fraction of times
when there is only one busy slice and both slices are busy, vs.
the effective traffic intensity ρ = ν1µ1 +
ν2
µ2
in Fig. 5. One can
see that, for both SCS and DPS, the time fraction when both
slices are busy increases with ρ, and that when only one slice
is busy first increases when ρ is low due to underutilization,
but decreases when ρ is high because the inter-slice contention
becomes inevitable. However the time fraction when both are
busy is always smaller under SCS than that under DPS.
B. Multiple-resource cases
We also test the performance of SCS under a more complex
setting where a simple cellular networks with both fronthaul and
backhaul resources are simulated.
Let us consider a setting with 6 fronthaul resources, 3 back-
haul resources, and a cloud computing resource. This system
supports two slices, each containing 3 user classes. Slice 1
includes Classes 1,2 and 3, while Slice 2 includes Classes 4,
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Fig. 3: Delay and throughput trade-offs of single-resource case
under asymmetric traffic.
User
Demand vector
Mean Arrival
class workload rate
Class 1 ( 5
6
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0.5, 0, 0, 0.217) 1 0.7
Class 2 (0, 5
6
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0.5, 0, 0, 0.217) 1 0.7
Class 3 (0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0.625, 0, 0.217) 1 0.7
Class 4 (0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0.625, 0, 0.217) 1 0.7
Class 5 (0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0.625, 0.217) 1 0.7
Class 6 (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0.625, 0.217) 1 0.7
TABLE II: Example resource allocation
5 and 6. The association between user classes and resources
is demonstrated in Fig. 6, and the demand vectors, as well as
the arrival rates and mean workloads, are given in Table II.
Slice 1’s share is ranged from 0.1 to 0.9, while s2 = 1 − s1.
The achieved performance trade-offs under different sharing
criteria are illustrated in Fig. 7. One can see that both SCS and
DRF outperform DPS in throughput, with similar mean delays
under all 3 criteria. Similar results are observed in a range of
settings with different traffic patterns and resource demands.
Moreover, in Fig. 8, we adjust the weighting schemes used in
DRF by voiding SCWA. Instead, wu = svδu, u ∈ U
v, and the
resources are provisioned according to DPS with weight wu.
The results show that without SCWA, DRF is similar to DPS
in both throughput and delay. Therefore, we can conclude that
SCWA is the root cause of the desirable performance, and SCS
can even improve the system performance while providing inter-
slice protection.
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Fig. 4: Delay and throughput trade-offs of single-resource case
under symmetric M/D/1 traffic model.
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Fig. 6: Association between user classes and resources.
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Fig. 7: Performance trade-offs of multi-resource case.
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Fig. 8: Performance trade-offs with DRF-weighted DPS.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper has explored a novel approach to resource allo-
cation for network slicing of distributed resources–SCS, pro-
viding inter-slice protection, load-driven elasticity and desirable
performance at the same time. SCS can be viewed as a key to
enabling low-complexity performance management in network
slicing, by exposing network shares to slice operators/tenants,
as a high-level resource management interface. This approach
can be further extended in two directions: i) if slices have highly
imbalanced spatial user distributions, it might be useful to let
slices specify different shares across different pools of resources,
e.g., regions corresponding to downtown, stadium and/or rural
area, see, e.g., [11]; and ii) slices may wish to request different
shares across types of resources, e.g., a slice may specify a
higher share of computational resource pool than that of the
communicational resources. For example, mobile cloud gaming
is computation intensive, thus the operator might want to reserve
more computing resources than connectivity. Finally, the share
abstraction provides a simple parametric “crude” model for
slice-level resource allocation which needs to interact with an
intra-slice performance management strategy.
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